Weakness · Critical

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

What it is

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

Likelihood of exploit: High8 exploited in the wildMITRE CWE 4.19.1

Severity (our rating): Critical
Likelihood of exploit: High
Introduced during: Architecture and Design
Exploited in the wild: 8 known exploited CVEs

In more detail

There are two main variations: Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks the input credentials against a hard-coded set of credentials. In this variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. It can also be difficult for the administrator to detect. Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains hard-coded credentials for connecting to that component. This variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product.

What an attacker can do

Bypass Protection Mechanism (Access Control)
Read Application Data (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other)
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other)
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other)
Other (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other)

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design

For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

How to find it

Black Box. Credential storage in configuration files is findable using black box methods, but the use of hard-coded credentials for an incoming authentication routine typically involves an account that is not visible outside of the code.
Automated Static Analysis. Automated white box techniques have been published for detecting hard-coded credentials for incoming authentication, but there is some expert disagreement regarding their effectiveness and applicability to a broad range of methods.
Manual Static Analysis. This weakness may be detectable using manual code analysis. Unless authentication is decentralized and applied throughout the product, there can be sufficient time for the analyst to find incoming authentication routines and examine the program logic looking for usage of hard-coded credentials. Configuration files could also be analyzed.
Manual Dynamic Analysis. For hard-coded credentials in incoming authentication: use monitoring tools that examine the product's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the product was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic. Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using call trees or similar artifacts from the output, examine the associated behaviors and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Network Sniffer Forced Path Execution
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Automated Static Analysis. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Configuration Checker
Architecture or Design Review. According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.) Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

CWE-798 on MITRE's CWE site

Exploited in the wild: 8 CVEs

Vulnerabilities caused by CWE-798 that attackers have used, from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, newest first.

All known exploited vulnerabilities

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Source: MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration, CWE version 4.19.1. CWE is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.