A processor event may allow transient operations to access architecturally restricted data (for example, in another address space) in a shared microarchitectural structure (for example, a CPU cache), potentially exposing the data over a covert channel.
Hardware designers may choose to engineer the processor's pipeline to prevent architecturally restricted data from being used by operations that can execute transiently.
Hardware designers may choose not to share microarchitectural resources that can contain sensitive data, such as fill buffers and store buffers.
Hardware designers may choose to sanitize specific microarchitectural state (for example, store buffers) when the processor transitions to a different context, such as whenever a system call is invoked. Alternatively, the hardware may expose instruction(s) that allow software to sanitize microarchitectural state according to the user or system administrator's threat model. These mitigation approaches are similar to those that address CWE-226; however, sanitizing microarchitectural state may not be the optimal or best way to mitigate this weakness on every processor design.
The hardware designer can attempt to prevent transient execution from causing observable discrepancies in specific covert channels.
Software architects may design software to enforce strong isolation between different contexts. For example, kernel page table isolation (KPTI) mitigates the Meltdown vulnerability [REF-1401] by separating user-mode page tables from kernel-mode page tables, which prevents user-mode processes from using Meltdown to transiently access kernel memory [REF-1404].
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