Weakness · High
CWE-1385: Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets
What it is
The product uses a WebSocket, but it does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
- Severity (our rating)
- High
- Likelihood of exploit
- Not rated by MITRE
- Introduced during
- Architecture and Design, Implementation
- Exploited in the wild
- No CVE in CISA's catalog
In more detail
WebSockets provide a bi-directional low latency communication (near real-time) between a client and a server. WebSockets are different than HTTP in that the connections are long-lived, as the channel will remain open until the client or the server is ready to send the message, whereas in HTTP, once the response occurs (which typically happens immediately), the transaction completes. A WebSocket can leverage the existing HTTP protocol over ports 80 and 443, but it is not limited to HTTP. WebSockets can make cross-origin requests that are not restricted by browser-based protection mechanisms such as the Same Origin Policy (SOP) or Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). Without explicit origin validation, this makes CSRF attacks more powerful.
What an attacker can do
- Varies by Context (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
- Gain Privileges or Assume Identity (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
- Bypass Protection Mechanism (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
- Read Application Data (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
- Modify Application Data (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
- DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control)
How to prevent it
Implementation
- Enable CORS-like access restrictions by verifying the 'Origin' header during the WebSocket handshake.
- Use a randomized CSRF token to verify requests.
- Use TLS to securely communicate using 'wss' (WebSocket Secure) instead of 'ws'.
- Leverage rate limiting to prevent against DoS. Use of the leaky bucket algorithm can help with this.
- Use a library that provides restriction of the payload size. For example, WS library for Node includes 'maxPayloadoption' that can be set.
- Treat data/input as untrusted in both directions and apply the same data/input sanitization as XSS, SQLi, etc.
Architecture and Design
- Require user authentication prior to the WebSocket connection being established. For example, the WS library in Node has a 'verifyClient' function.
H2 Security
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Start freeSource: MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration, CWE version 4.19.1. CWE is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.